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ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on policy implementation in higher education (HE) to be ana-
lysed through the evolution and transformation of the policy instruments, namely those re-
lated to the Government funding and evaluation. The research questions are: to what extent 
instruments can reveal the evolution of policy rationales and justifications? How instruments 
emerged, and become institutionalised, affecting and being affected by the characteristics of 
national configuration of HE systems? Whether and how they produce desired effects or 
evolve in unpredictable ways, generating unexpected results, playing new roles and function-
alities? The evolution of the instruments seems to be dependent on some characteristics of the 
context and some key features of the instruments. The development has been often inspired 
by NPM principles, which aimed at increasing steering capacity of the policy maker on one 
side, and university role and autonomy on the other. The common narrative is then declined in 
very different ways among countries, and instruments implementation reveals the extent to 
which it is adapted to the existing characters (dominant paradigm) of the HE system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
his paper represents the first out-
come produced in the framework 
of the EUROHESC project on 
transforming universities in Europe 
(TRUE); it focuses on policy implemen-
tation in higher education (HE) to be ana-
lysed through the evolution and transfor-
mation of the policy instruments, namely 
funding mechanisms and evaluation in-
struments. We want to investigate: a) 
How steering and governance instru-
ments have been put into action, how this 
process impacts and modifies the original 
rationales and justifications, and how the 
implementation is affected by path de-
pendence; b) The characteristics of the in-
struments adopted in different national 
contexts, the types of contamination and 
combination effects that can be detected, 
and to what extent they are able to depict 
the characteristics of the HE national con-
figurations. 
In our work we refer to the literature on 
policy implementation as evolution of the 
policy action (Majone, Wildawsky, 1978) 
and to the governance by instruments ap-
proach (Lascoumes and Les Gàles, 2004). 
Our main statement is that policy instru-
ments reveal how policies have been put 
into action, how rationales changed be-
side labelling and political rhetoric, and 
the role played by the actors involved. 
The implementation of the policy instru-
ments should be investigated by analys-
ing the transformation produced by the 
interactions between policy makers, in-
termediaries, stakeholders at national, su-
pra-national and local levels, including 
the level of the Higher Education institu-
tions (HEIs) to which the instruments 
have been applied. In this paper we pre-
sents a first-step analysis based on the 
evidences emerging from the literature, 
the policy reports and the administrative 
documents of the countries involved in 
the analysis. 
We look at two types of instruments, 
namely funding mechanisms and evalua-
tion instruments, which are tools widely 
diffused in the European HE systems. 
The shift toward the managerial paradigm 
starting from the 80s and affecting all the 
European countries, with different rate 
and pace, have been pushed forward 
though a large diffusion of these instru-
ments. Moreover, market-based reforms 
stressed the use of funding formula for 
allocating government core funding; re-
forms tended to modify teaching fees in 
order to get them similar to real “prices”, 
and to improve government project fund-
ing as well as the attraction of market-
based funding. Other actors (mainly 
European Union, local governments and 
non-for profit organisations) have been 
providing growing amount of money to 
HEIs. On the one hand, these processes 
generated diverse “modes of funding” 
impacting on the organisation and func-
tioning of the HEIs. On the other hand, 
the need to improve HEIs' performance 
and make them “accountable” reinforced 
the introduction of assessment and moni-
toring of teaching and research, auditing 
and checking, producing different 
“modes of evaluation”, thus enhancing 
processes of differentiation between high 
level performing/excellent organisation 
and low performing/poor ones.  
We adopt a diachronic perspective along 
the last fifteen years, and a comparative 
approach across eight European coun-
tries, those involved in the TRUE Project 
(France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, UK). 
The paper is organised as follow. The 
first section presents the main finding of 
the literature on policy implementation in 
HE and how the analysis relates to im-
plementation; the second and the third 
sessions focus on the approach by in-
struments for studying policy action and 
policy instruments in the field of HE 
studies, the fourth session deals with the 
T
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research questions and the conceptual 
framework adopted. Section five presents 
the implementation of funding (formula 
and project funding) and evaluation 
(quality assurance, research evaluation 
and rankings) in the relevant countries, 
while the last sessions develop discussion 
and conclusions. 
1. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
THROUGH POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
Questioning how policies are imple-
mented means understanding how they 
are put into action, and the conditions for 
achieving the expected results. The so-
called rationale or linear model outlined 
policy making as a sequential problem 
solving process, where implementation is 
one of the phases just after the decision 
activities (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). 
This model shows strong conceptual 
shortcomings (Sutton, 1999). Among 
these, the proposed dichotomy between 
policy and implementation is unrealistic 
and dangerous, since it avoids responsi-
bility of the policy makers. Evidences 
coming from different pieces of literature 
suggest that policy implementation is “an 
ongoing, non-linear process that must be 
managed” (Plant, 1995). The quoted au-
thor sets out six key activities for suc-
cessful implementation linked to the 
management of the change process. Other 
issues facilitating the development of 
policies highlighted by the literature are: 
narratives and discourses, labelling, the 
role played by interested groups (epis-
temic communities and networks), the 
consensus and the propensity toward in-
novation. 
Implementation studies have had an in-
teresting development of perspective and 
critique (O’Toole, 2000), from the book 
of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) set-
ting the notion of policy implementation, 
to the seminal work of Cerych and Sabat-
ier (1986) about HE reforms in different 
countries, whose purpose was to analyse 
the reasons for the success or failure of 
these reforms, distinguishing between 
three stages of public policy, namely 
formulation, implementation and refor-
mulation. Cerych and Sabatier systemati-
cally compared goals and outcome of the 
reforms, as well as the factors affecting 
the attainment of the goals. The analysis 
took into account the importance of the 
change envisaged, the clarity and the 
consistence of the aims. The authors then 
revised this conceptualisation into a 
framework where the relevant dimen-
sions were the deepness of change with 
respect to the existing values and prac-
tices, the number of functional areas 
where the change is expected, the level of 
change with respect to the target inter-
ested by the reform (HE system, sub-
sectors or institutions). From this first 
systematic work, a debate follows along 
two main approaches for implementation 
studies: the top-down and the bottom up. 
The former opens the field of implemen-
tation studies (O’Toole, 1986, Id., 2000), 
while the latter represents a reaction of 
criticism (Elmore, 1980), then followed 
by a combination of the two models pro-
posed by Pressmen and Wildavsky 
(1984) and Majone and Wildavsky, 
(1978). Majone and Wildavsky defined 
the essence of implementation as evolu-
tion, which implies a continuous process 
of reformulation and new design of the 
original one. According to this view, im-
plementation has the effect to change a 
policy through a process of mutual adap-
tation, learning negotiations and interac-
tions (Browne and Wildavsky, 1984; 
Barnett and Fudge, 1981). A further ap-
plication of combined models is the Ad-
vocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), de-
veloped by Sabatier, designed for policy 
issues characterised by high goal uncer-
tainty, high technical uncertainty and by a 
large number of actors coming from mul-
tiple levels of government (Sabatier, 
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2003, p.30). The author claims that the 
model is not able to address the HE re-
forms, because the filed is not character-
ised by conflicts in the beliefs system on 
the goals. Researchers and agencies in-
volved in a policy subsystem are supposed 
to play a more neutral role; the presence of 
policy coalitions can be questioned, involv-
ing different actors as politicians, agency 
officials, stakeholders, intellectual, re-
searchers sharing normative and causal be-
liefs on core HE policy issues.  
Gornitzka et al, (2003) discussed the rea-
sons for the low interest in implementa-
tion research in HE, that can be referred 
on the one hand, to the lack of a unified 
perspective in the discipline, and on the 
other hand, to the difficulties of looking 
at implementation in a field characterised 
by many autonomous actors, diffusion of 
authority, ambitious and multiple goals, 
lack of consensus on new objectives and 
on new functions going beyond education 
and research. The authors also recognised 
the relevance of implementation studies 
in HE due to the transformation of the 
public interest in the field, which often 
includes concerns on efficiency and ef-
fectiveness. Improving knowledge about 
the way reforms have been put into action 
is a key issue to understanding the effec-
tiveness of processes, how other external 
trends (globalisation, internationalisation, 
marketisation) affect it, or new emerging 
stakeholders influence the practice reali-
sation of the policy. Looking at the HE 
field, Gornitzka et al. (2003) outlined a 
certain number of studies that are defi-
nitely dealing with policy implementa-
tion, although they are labelled in differ-
ent ways. Some of them use the organisa-
tional theory approach, as for instance to 
deepen the implementation of New Pub-
lic Management (NPM) in HE in differ-
ent countries, an issue that Paradeise et al 
(2009) dealt with, taking as research 
question how organisations change in re-
sponse to the government policies. The 
quoted work uses both the resource de-
pendency theory and the neo-institutional 
theory, and develops an analysis of the 
relationships between specific policies 
affecting HE reforms from the eighties to 
2000s, in order to understand how formal 
designs have been changed, and how 
HEIs responded to the policy initiative, 
reformulating the original objectives and 
goals (Paradeise et al, 2009). Other stud-
ies on implementation used the network 
approach, where the interest is not only 
on how policies have evolved in practice, 
but also on where these policies come 
from, which kind of interactions gener-
ated them. Reforms are seen as continu-
ous, and grounded on the history of the 
countries where they are produced and 
applied; moreover, reforms are at the same 
time drivers of desired and non-desired 
changes, as well as responses to changes 
occurred in the environment or within the 
institutions (Bleiklie et al., 2000). 
In our work we intend to look at imple-
mentation as a continuous process of ne-
gotiation between actors involved, whose 
interactions modify the policy intentions 
and goals. Both formal and informal 
processes are relevant for implementa-
tion: authoritative government decisions 
as well as the pressures coming from the 
environment and from the assets inside 
the HEIs. Policy design and policy im-
plementation are not separate phases as in 
the linear model, rather feedback effects 
are visible in the evolutionary path, 
which is influenced by the environment 
as well as by the institutional context. 
Problems addressed by the policy action 
are never solved, but evolve in non-linear 
neither predictable way, rather implemen-
tation creates a new reality (McLaughlin, 
1987). We intend to study implementa-
tion of HE policy by looking at the evolu-
tion of the policy instruments, which 
support the putting of policies into action. 
This perspective implies further consid-
erations on the approach by instruments. 
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2. THE APPROACH BY INSTRUMENTS 
FOR STUDYING THE POLICY ACTION 
The study of public policy through the 
analysis of the instruments was first pro-
posed by Foucault (Foucault, 1988) and 
later developed by Lascoumes e Le Galès 
(2004). According to this approach, in-
struments are considered as institutions 
(North, 2000) autonomous in respect to 
the goals for which they were originally 
established, they follow peculiar path of 
development interacting with the way the 
actors use them.   
Lascoumes and Le Galès (2004) depict 
the instruments as institutions that enable 
a policy to be operative and that organize 
the relationship between the public power 
and the recipients, according to the repre-
sentations (goals) and meanings (values) 
that they incorporate. Thus the instru-
ments reveal (indicate) the real choices of 
public policies and their characteristics. 
This implies two consequences. 
First of all, instruments incorporate a the-
ory of the relationship between govern-
ment and governed institutions. Second, 
instruments are not neutral: they keep 
memory of the policies that created them 
and they are vehicles of specific values. 
Since they are institutions, they also gen-
erate effects that are not connected the 
original goals, they tend to modify the 
goals and eventually distort them, creat-
ing stable beliefs. Being institutions also 
mean that instruments persist through out 
time and they usually change incremen-
tally, by addition or change of specific 
devices, rather than by radical break-
throughs. Because of the persistence dur-
ing time, and the inertia for implement-
ing, every government generally uses the 
instruments created by its predecessor, 
adapting them to the new policies, while 
only in rare cases the whole instrument is 
removed and substituted. Changes in the 
instruments compel the actors to adapt; 
thus, instruments tend to increase the 
power of the elites, they postpone politi-
cal goals to action, and their combination 
makes actors’ behaviour easily defined 
and foreseeable (Power, 1999). In this 
sense, instruments reveal the actors be-
haviour (individuals and organisations). 
Innovating instruments can pursue differ-
ent objectives: from the development of 
solutions linked to the “new governance” 
(Salamon, 2002) to fostering the rein-
forcement of top down controls (Hood, 
1998) by de-legitimating of the “old” in-
struments, which are not able to foster the 
modernisation of the public action. One 
important characteristic is that the agree-
ment on the instruments is easier than on 
policy objectives; thus instruments would 
allow in principle more spaces for negotia-
tion between different actors involved; 
moreover, the multiplication, specialisa-
tion and fragmentation of the instruments 
can be depicted as a way for achieving ob-
jectives linked to the managerial paradigm 
through incentives schemes rather than 
with normative/prescriptive norms. 
Modifications of the instruments do not 
necessarily mean changing the policy 
goals; in some cases instruments can be 
modified or substituted by others esteemed 
to be more effective; in other cases, modi-
fications in the instruments can modify the 
goals as well. Analysing instruments is thus 
useful because their change through out 
time reveals the strategies of the actors; in 
this sense the instruments may be both vec-
tor of change and stability. 
Challenging the old instruments may be 
necessary for the policy action, but some-
times manipulation may well serve to 
hide the fact the pursued goals are always 
the same (for instance: a policy oriented 
to reduce the investment may be pursued 
by multiplying and combining different 
measure in order to dissemble the final 
result). In other occasions, the instru-
ments may be helpful to implement 
choices that in this way will be discon-
nected by the responsibility of the future 
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governments (for instance automatic 
sanctions for not meeting specific stan-
dard, norm or performance indicator).  
A crucial element in this analysis is the 
comprehension on the one hand of the 
bounding capability imposed by the in-
strument and on the other hand of the 
freedom and space of manoeuvre that it 
leaves to the actors, how the instruments 
change the actors policy spaces (Braun, 
2006). For instance, shaping the objec-
tives about the performance can be im-
plemented through compulsory rules, or 
through standards, or guidelines. In all 
the cases the recipients have different 
room of manoeuvre and possibility to 
create spaces for policy action. Moreover, 
it is important to consider path depend-
ency effects (North, 2000) that influence 
the present functioning of the instruments 
and how the instruments themselves will 
affect future choices as well.   
3. THE POLICY INSTRUMENTS  
IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
In the last 20 years most European coun-
tries faced a multiplication of the instru-
ments used by the government for steer-
ing the HEIs, with a common justification 
toward improving performance and re-
sponsiveness, and the level of institu-
tional autonomy. Most of the instruments 
can be related to the emergence of the 
managerial paradigm, linked to the neo-
liberal ideas and the NPM narrative. Sev-
eral instruments can be included into this 
rationale, such as ex-post allocation, 
evaluation, social accountability. Along 
this tendency, different conflicting con-
ceptions of the relationships between the 
State and the HEIs can be identified 
(command and control, “regulation by the 
community”, stimulating market forces, 
repairing market failures) and different 
objectives of policy intervention as well 
(optimal allocation of resources or im-
proving the evolution capability of the 
system). Each of the aforementioned 
conceptions refers to different desired 
changes (for instance they are related to 
the ideas of what Universities should be 
according to a universalistic, institutional 
or instrumentalist perspective) and about 
the type and the value of the expected 
outcome of the HEIs (public goods, 
commodities, or learning outcome). Our 
expectation is that instruments would al-
low understanding changes in the narra-
tive and in the actors’ relationships in dif-
ferent national environments. 
Dealing with policy instruments aimed at 
steering HEIs means understanding spe-
cific features linked to this type of or-
ganisations, and identifying a perimeter 
for the analysis. 
As to the former, we follow the Mus-
selin’s proposition of HEIs as specific or-
ganisations (Musselin, 2007) because of 
three characteristics: their academic tasks 
(teaching and research) are functionally 
loosely coupled, they are also complex 
processes so that difficult to grasp (close 
for investigation and difficult to be de-
scribed or reproduced), and, lastly, the 
causal relationships between tasks and re-
sults are ambiguous. Nevertheless Mus-
selin stressed also the importance of for-
mal structures and rules in HEIs because 
of their capacity to be a way for organisa-
tions to appear as rational actors, to gain 
legitimacy, and to conform to the institu-
tional environment. Rules matter because 
“defining territories and borders and in 
protecting insiders”, so they have also a 
defensive role, and generate defensive ca-
pacity against changes. The consequences 
are that the efficiency of top-down hierar-
chical leadership is difficult to gain, and 
the diffusion of change and innovation 
may be complicate. Thus, the aforemen-
tioned specificities must be taken into ac-
count when studying policy instruments 
for steering the HEIs, since the effects and 
the effectiveness can vary a lot.  
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As to the latter, we know that different 
countries adopted different instruments as 
well as combination of instruments for 
different policy aims. As a consequence, 
any comparative effort might be strongly 
constrained by the diversities of the ob-
jects under analysis. Nevertheless, we 
also know that from the 80s a clear 
movement can be seen in most western 
European countries, which converges 
around the adoption of funding and 
evaluation as instruments for steering the 
HEIs. Thus, considering both the afore-
mentioned sets of instruments can be jus-
tified by their diffusion, which would al-
low a comparative perspective of the 
analysis. Funding includes formula and 
all the relate devices (such as perform-
ance assessment for teaching and re-
search, standards and rules) and project 
funding schemes; evaluation includes the 
research assessment exercises, the use of 
rankings, and systems for quality assu-
rance. 
A central research question is to what ex-
tent the instruments can explain changes 
of the HEIs. According to the suggestion 
of Ferlie, Musselin and Andresani (Ferlie 
et al., 2008), the approach by instrument 
is a promising perspective for analysing 
the transformation of Universities; they 
suggest to explore how instruments for 
policy action reflect the changes in the 
narratives for steering and governance, 
namely the transition from the NPM, the 
network governance and the neo-
Weberian considered as ideal types of 
public sector organisation.1 
Instruments also incorporate the kind of 
interaction between the State and the or-
                                                                    
                                                                   
1  For these authors the most interesting set of 
tools are those linked to evaluation, to formula for 
both funding and human resources allocation, and 
networking governance, thus the devolution of 
responsibilities for HE policy to specialised 
agencies or to leaders. The interest and the 
importance of these tools come from the fact that 
they are largely diffused within Europe, and their 
evolution went on for many years. 
ganisations or the individuals. Again, ac-
cording to Braun (Braun, 2006b), in re-
search policy the interactions between 
policy makers and scientific community 
can be analysed on the basis of two types 
of relationships: trust and delegation. 
Some commonalities can be detected be-
tween the two, because both are social 
structures, deriving from decisions under 
risk taken by policy makers; both entail 
resources invested on the base of hopes 
and expectations about other actors’ be-
haviour, and face uncertainty about the 
future using some control mechanisms. 
Also differences can be detected: delega-
tion is an authority relation, which use 
some type of contract for defining the 
discretion space, while trust is not en-
forceable by law and the risk is “incorpo-
rated into the decision of whether or not 
to engage in the action” (Braun, 2006). 
Braun puts into evidence different op-
tions2 available to policy makers for re-
ducing the risk of the research invest-
ment; these different options have been 
introduced in different periods of time, 
and sometimes the last ones co-exist with 
the older ones. A transformation of dele-
gation modes from the 70s to the 90s is 
described, going from a blind delegation, 
where policy makers trust scientists, to a 
contract mode, where a contract relation-
ship with policy makers and organisations 
(instead of scientists) come into evidence, 
and network delegation mode, where the 
State is only a facilitator, thus gives the 
means to research institutions and scientists 
to self organise innovation networks with 
user systems, while it left out pretensions 
of instrumental guidance. National and 
European policy processes often concur to 
shape governance and steering instruments 
through the so-called “two way causality” 
 
2  Creating consensus and interaction spaces (for 
instance new institutions, such as public-private 
networks), changing career patterns, using 
intermediaries of trust (peer reviewers), and 
funding agencies. 
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rule; thus, both national and European poli-
cies tend to act as interlinked factors, in-
ducing transformation in the European HE 
policies. The literature on the Europeanisa-
tion process, proposes different approaches 
in order to explain the mutual influence of 
European processes and national policies: a 
top-down approach (Radaelli, 2000), a bot-
tom-up one (Bache, 2005) and a combina-
tion of the two (Borzel, 2000). 
The result is that instruments may incor-
porate combinations of different ration-
ales and justifications, related to policy 
objectives elaborated at different policy 
levels. The definition of new funding and 
evaluation schemes for research activities 
may lead to new patterns of governance 
for research, more precisely a multilevel 
governance, both local, national and in-
ternational. (Feron, Crowley, 2002; En-
ders, Fulton, 2002). As to the national 
level, instruments reveal the rationales of 
the central government and the local 
ones, and also in that cases we can face 
different combinations between the two 
or contradictory patterns. 
Braun (2006a) stated about the existence 
of a mix of policy rationales dominating 
the discursive space of S&T policies. He 
distinguished between the "horizontal di-
mension", where different discourses on 
legitimization and transformation co-
existed, and the “vertical dimension”, 
which refers to the struggle between sector 
and global dimensions of policy ration-
ales. A causal link between policy ration-
ales and instruments cannot be identified. 
Nevertheless, he observed dynamics from 
the eighties of the discursive spaces sug-
gesting “that the policy instruments used today 
[…] are neither based on one unifying paradigm 
nor that they are chosen completely at random. The 
mix of policy-instruments and the shifts in the im-
portance of various instruments is very likely the 
outcome of the complex and intense struggle, […] 
on different levels of the discursive space of the 
S&T sector.” 
Bleiklie et al. (2009) outlined the pres-
ence of an overall process of rationalisa-
tion of the HE policies, which is reflected 
in the development of common legisla-
tion, degree system, evaluation criteria, 
but also favours differentiations in the 
ways HEIs act and perceive their position 
within their environment. If rationalisa-
tion is the more general trend driving the 
formulation of policies, the policy in-
struments that are generated at different 
policy levels should evolve by incorpo-
rating common rationales, while trans-
formations should emerge according to 
the way in which the different actors 
(State, academics and stakeholders) use 
the instruments themselves.  
4. RESEARCH QUESTION  
AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
For the purpose of our research, we adapt 
the definition of the policy instrument pro-
vided by Lascomes and Les Gòles, consid-
ering instruments technical and social insti-
tutions, which put the policy into action 
regulating the power relationships between 
the governor and the governed actors on 
the basis of the incorporated representa-
tions, meanings and values. Changes in the 
instruments and in their mix reveal the 
characteristics of the policy implementation 
(actors involved, power relationships and 
interdependencies), providing knowledge 
on how policies evolve. The analysis 
should also allow to depicting unpredict-
able effects deriving from the use of a pol-
icy instruments within a certain environ-
ment, and from the combination of differ-
ent instruments.  
In this paper we address formula, project 
funding, quality assurance and research as-
sessment exercises, and take care of the 
emergence of rankings as policy instru-
ments. The reason for choosing the afore-
mentioned institutions is that they were at 
the core of most HE policy reforms, and 
were linked to policy motivations present-
ing many similarities between European 
countries, namely the need of a substantial 
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turn of HEIs toward efficiency and effec-
tiveness, the reduction of the role of the 
State by adopting a 'steering at the distance' 
model, improving the capability of the 
HEIs to attract external funding, pursuing 
the HEIs quality through the enhancement 
of competition for funding. Autonomy and 
accountability have been considered as the 
main conditions for achieving the afore-
mentioned results; allocation of govern-
ment resources, competitive public project 
funding, evaluation of teaching and re-
search the main steering instruments. 
Within the described landscape, the emer-
gence of rankings represent a singular case 
of a device that suddenly gain a central role 
steering the HEIs, although it does not ori-
gin from a policy initiative.  
Formula is a sort of guideline for allocat-
ing basic government funding on the base 
of rational and equitable criteria, provid-
ing a stable and predictable level of fund-
ing. Formula calculation varies over time, 
reflecting the changes in the emphasis of 
the government on different objectives. It 
is based on a combination of input and 
output indicators aimed to represent the 
performance of the HEis, but might in-
clude also incentives for specific 
achievements. Moreover, formula gener-
ally goes with other systems of core fund-
ing allocation, namely the historical one, 
can include negotiation processes be-
tween the HEIs and the government, and 
generally applies only to a limited quota 
of the overall government funding. 
Project funding refers to a set of schemes 
introduced by governments in different 
countries over the years to steer the HE 
system and to address particular policy ob-
jectives (research priorities, new devel-
opments, premium and incentives, joint 
and open programming). Project funds are 
thus generally associated to competitive 
allocation modes, and aimed at achieving 
specific results. The importance is spe-
cially linked to the cut of basic core fund-
ing, which impact deeply the resources 
available for research, pushing the organi-
sations to seek external resources.  
The term quality assurance (QA) includes 
two main activities: accreditation and 
evaluation schemes. Schwarz and 
Westerheijden, (2004) consider accredita-
tion schemes 'all institutionalised and 
systematically implemented evaluation 
schemes of HEIs, degree types and pro-
grammes that end in a formal summary 
judgement that leads to formal approval 
processes'. The accreditation confers a 
legal status to the institution or a study 
program, together with the duty for the 
government to distribute funds and/or 
grants. Evaluation schemes aim at 'meas-
uring, analysing and or developing qual-
ity of institutions, degree types and/or 
programmes that do not directly or indi-
rectly lead to approval processes'. The 
boundaries between approval and ac-
creditation and between accreditation and 
evaluation may be blurred. QA instru-
ments show some drawbacks: on the one 
side, accreditation and accountability that 
sets minimum standards may reduce the 
incentives to be above the threshold. On 
the other side, where quality improve-
ment is the major goal of evaluation, giv-
ing consequences to evaluation outcome 
is up to the evaluated HEIs, since quality 
can not be 'inspected' from the outside 
(Schwarz and Westerheijden, 2004 citing 
Dill, 1995). Thus, the government deci-
sion-making faces a paradox: real conse-
quences are necessary to take evaluation 
seriously, but they would also turn 
evaluation into a power game where re-
sults count more than the quality. More 
often, government chooses a mid way 
and states that results will 'inform' fund-
ing, but not automatically, for instance 
through contract negotiations. 
Research evaluation is a policy instru-
ment aimed at providing information to 
policy makers on the quality and the re-
search performance of the HEIs. It can be 
drawn in very different ways, as to the 
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overall design, criteria, methods and indi-
cators (input, output and process indica-
tors), and can be addressed to a broad 
range of uses, among which the most dif-
fused one is allocation of funding. 
Jongbloed (2007) indicates several moti-
vations for government enhancing the re-
search assessment as instrument for 
measuring the research performance, 
namely enhancing accountability, inform-
ing policy-making, institutional market-
ing. Research evaluation produces effects 
on reputation and visibility of the HEIs, but 
the main drawback rest on the fact that it 
involves complex methodological frame-
work, results might be difficult to inter-
preter, and it is costly and time consuming. 
These are some reasons for ranking 
emerges suddenly, having an enormous 
echo, which impact deeply on the HEIs. 
We intend to investigate if the choice of 
the instruments indicates the public poli-
cies implementation and its characteristics 
(rationales and justifications); under which 
conditions instruments are likely to evolve 
in unpredictable ways, that are not con-
nected with the objectives pursued or the 
functionality originally assigned to them; 
how the national context and policy mix 
facilitate or constrain the implementation.  
One can consider the modification and the 
evolution in the instruments of the policy 
action in HE as a dependent variable of a 
top-down process driven by policy makers 
located at national, supra-national, or in-
termediate levels. In this perspective, 
change can result from a hierarchical proc-
ess (from central policies to institutions and 
then individuals) or as the product of a re-
verse process coming from the bottom up, 
mainly grounded on the autonomy of the 
HEIs and on the academic freedom. An-
other approach (Bleiklie, Kogan, 2007) 
considers change as the outcome of “multi-
ple interlocking processes” within aca-
demic disciplines, institutions and central 
authority. HEIs are regulated by more than 
one system, namely government, interme-
diary layers, and academics; moreover, ten-
sions in the relationships between actors 
involved in the process are not restricted to 
the HEIs and the State, but other layers 
such as agencies, intermediaries, buffers 
and academics, are involved as well. 
Because we intend to use an approach to 
policy implementation as evolution in a 
comparative perspective, we consider 
more useful to study changes of the steer-
ing and governance instruments as a 
complex process involving multiple ac-
tors and processes, which are inscribed in 
the national configurations of the HE sys-
tems (Musselin, 2004).  
Testing all the hypotheses would need to 
look at policy documents and administra-
tive sources for identifying the character-
istics of the instruments. Nevertheless it 
is also necessary to look inside the HEIs 
in order to analyse how instruments have 
been re-shaped by the actors involved, 
thus how instruments reveals actors’ be-
haviours and strategies. At this stage the 
paper develop upon the main reform 
processes affecting the selected instru-
ments, the most relevant funding instru-
ments where data and information were 
available, the institutional evaluation ex-
ercises (sponsor, aim, design, tools, out-
come, effects on governance and steer-
ing) and the ranking practices. We leave 
out the analysis different policy layers at 
national level and inside the HEIs, which 
will be developed in the second phase of 
the TRUE project. Although the limita-
tion of the analysis, we think that inter-
esting results can be envisaged even at 
this first stage, indicating the evolution-
ary path of policy implementation in dif-
ferent national contexts, showing phe-
nomena of convergence and divergence 
to be explored though an empirical analy-
sis of the actors’ motivations, rationales 
and behaviours.3 
                                                                    
3  Furthermore, we do not take into account at 
this moment how market forces, networks or 
other intermediaries, which can be labelled as in-
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5.  THE IMPLEMENTATION  
OF THE POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
Four fundamental aspects can be consi-
dered to describe the evolution of the HE 
funding instruments: 
- The role of formula and project fund-
ing for the allocation of public fund-
ing. 
- The relationship and division of pow-
ers between Central state and the re-
gions. 
- Influence and interaction with Euro-
pean processes. 
- The role of governmental agencies in 
funding. 
 
The combinations of these elements are 
many and they significantly influence the 
evolution of reforms and instruments. It 
also important to specify the kind of 
steering goals the policy makers have. 
According to the state supervisor para-
digm, universities become more autono-
mous while the state sets the goals and 
evaluate their accomplishment. The state 
may pursue a mere functional/procedural 
efficiency; more often, the increasing 
relevance of HE and research activity for 
society and economy has justified also 
the pursuit of substantial goals. The goals 
pursued have influenced the choice of the 
funding instruments and their features. 
The description of National cases in An-
nex 1 may help to set the general obser-
vation presented in the forthcoming sub-
sessions.  
5.1 The evolution of funding instruments 
Since the seventies in many European 
countries the growth of investments in 
HE began to slow down, while the num-
                                                                                               
ternal or external stakeholders, generate policy 
instruments or affect/transform the existing ones, 
as well as how policy instruments at HEIs level 
are constructed or de-constructed according to 
internal or external drivers of changes. 
ber of students accessing to universities 
started growing faster. These facts in-
creased pressure on HE system for reach-
ing more ambitious target with equal 
amount of funding. Moreover, through 
out the second half of the XX century the 
society and policy makers became con-
scious of the benefits that research activ-
ity could generate. The rationale that jus-
tifies the introduction of new allocation 
mechanism is the pursuit of allocation ef-
ficiency, both in terms of result-cost ratio 
and response to societal needs.  
The assumption of a never-ending public 
sector expansion began to be challenged. 
In Europe, the United Kingdom since 
early ’80 represented the forerunner in a 
reform process inspired by managerial 
concepts of the private economy. In the 
new conception of HE, the state gains an 
important role in mediating the interests 
of the society and should orient the de-
velopment of the HE. Despite a wide de-
bate on the international breadth of the 
NPM, recent overview found evidence of 
NPM influence in many countries with 
even late-comers, such as France, finally 
adopting some NPM like reforms.  
The NPM narrative is also complemented 
with other two conceptions on the evolv-
ing role of the State in the public sector. 
The network based governance points out 
a ‘hollowing out’ process of the state that 
seems to have lost its monopoly of power 
by delegating to other public levels of 
government upward (European Union) 
and downward (regions) and other stake-
holders as well. The State plays a new 
role as ‘facilitator’, instead of steering 
and commanding it must bargain and co-
ordinate the many actors involved. The 
neo-weberian perspective is inspired the 
principle of democratic revitalization 
within the public management reform, by 
reaffirming the role of the state as the 
main facilitator of solutions and reinforc-
ing representative democracy. Focusing 
on the policy level does not take into ac-
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count the real impact of other actors, 
which may interact at a formal as well as 
informal level; rather, the instruments 
may provide a better ex-post insight of 
the combination of forces that may have 
produced the final asset.  
The mix of instruments and their use is 
hybrid and in transition. Elements of the 
three narratives can be found in almost all 
countries but NPM appears to have the 
largest and more detailed evidences 
(Paradeise et al, 2009; Ferlie et al., 2008). 
The instrument alone is not a clear sign 
of one narrative or another, rather it is the 
way formula, contract and project fund-
ing are implemented that is relevant; for 
instance, contract between the state and 
the university may be: 
- Strongly top-down and detailed 
(NPM); 
- Based on bargaining between HEI 
top management and the Ministry 
sharing similar powers (network); 
- Involving in the bargaining process 
also professionals and students (neo-
weberian). 
 
By considering the National cases in the 
Annex 1, it is possible to underline some 
similarities existing in the evolution of 
the instruments across different countries. 
 
Formula 
Formula funding has been adopted in dif-
ferent periods, for instance in France it is 
used since 1968 while in Italy it was 
adopted only 30 years later; still some 
common phases and key events can be 
observed. Formula in most cases starts 
considering only teaching, and simple in-
put indicators, such as number of students 
and cost of production weighted for dis-
ciplinary field. Sometimes formula is 
completed by contracts with each univer-
sity, at this stage also the contracts are 
simple.  
The formula may evolve and include a 
separate and specific part for research ac-
tivity, with simple input parameters 
(number and qualification of researchers 
weighted per disciplinary sector, external 
funds attracted – Italy 2003) and simple 
output indicators (scientific production 
computed through bibliometric indexes – 
Norway 2002). 
Along the last fifteen years, formula 
tends to become more complex (Fig. 1). 
In teaching, formula linked to simple 
output and efficacy indicators was suit-
able for expansion period (depending 
from one country to another, since 70s 
until early 00s) because it sets clear in-
centives to productivity, even if it often 
favour opportunistic behaviours (Italy, 
Portugal). However, the Bologna process 
dictates more complex criteria, especially 
in those countries that shifted to the bi-
nary system, and the end of the HE ex-
pansion period requires a new focus on 
quality and efficiency.   
When expansion chase to be the main 
priority, then the formula may follow dif-
ferent paths. Some countries adopt output 
indicators (Portugal). In Italy a quantita-
tive evaluation process of the teaching 
supply is established, despite this process 
may produce and over detailed regulation 
and the return of a bureaucratic approach. 
In other countries the formula does not 
evolve, this happens because the control 
of quality is likely to be better done by 
other channels. For instance, in the Neth-
erlands the model of governance enables 
a direct control of the policy makers, 
since the most important academic bodies 
are, directly or indirectly, appointed by 
the Ministry. In UK the quasi market and 
vertical diversification are enhanced and 
generate alternative mechanisms for qual-
ity and efficiency assurance.  
The research component may become 
more linked to scientific productivity, 
measured though more accurate tools: for 
instance, in Norway the bibliometric 
model becomes more elaborated and 
comprehends all fields, in Italy a peer re-
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view evaluation process is established. 
Similarly to what observed for the teach-
ing component, in some countries the re-
search component does not evolve. This 
may be explained by the fact that policy 
maker esteems project funding, contracts 
and direct interaction with the academics 
as more effective. For instance, in the 
Netherlands research evaluation is com-
mon practice since a long time, but it 
does not directly influence resource allo-
cation; in Switzerland, the Federal gov-
ernment focuses on project funding 
through specific agencies, and the can-
tonal governments prefer a direct rela-
tionship and bargaining with the HEI; in 
Germany, contract enables the Land to 
specify targets for each institution, while 
the Federal government relies on direct 
funding through excellence initiative.  
Where the regional level plays a relevant 
role (Germany, Switzerland), when a di-
rect and consolidate contract relationship 
exists  (France) and when the government 
appoints and overview the university 
leadership (Netherlands), then contract-
ing and direct formal and informal rela-
tionship enable more flexibility and de-
tailed steering, which represent meaning-
ful advantages in respect to the formula, 
at least from the policy maker point of 
view. 
 
Figure 1 – Formula funding 
 
 
Source: designed by the authors 
 
Figure 2 – Project funding 
 
 
Source: designed by the authors 
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Figure 3 – Contract evolution 
 
 
Source: designed by the authors 
 
 
 
Project funding 
In most countries project funding rose as an 
instrument for funding curiosity driven re-
search, and was managed by academics. 
Through out time this instrument diversi-
fies to fund specific issues, while the influ-
ence of policy makers and industry in the 
selection of research themes grows (Fig. 2).  
In some countries, the new mission 
oriented and themes specific projects 
becomes the most important source for 
project funding. In other cases the free 
projects share remain large, but the policy 
maker pursues more international 
orientation in research by delegating the 
project selection to foreign reviewers. 
 
Contract 
Contract and formula funding often occur 
together. Contract tends to become more 
detailed (Fig. 3), and the impact on fund-
ing is further improved. France represents 
a particular case, since the use of contract 
emerged since the beginning of the nine-
ties and unexpectedly became the lever 
that strengthened the national steering 
and favoured the emergence of universi-
ties as major actors of the HE system.  
Formula, contract and project may have 
different steering orientations and be 
combined in possible modes (Table 1). 
What influences the way funding instru-
ments are used, combined and their evo-
lution? Two elements seem to play an 
important role:  
− how strong and persistent the politi-
cal will is; 
− being the most important steering 
level of the HEIs regional or na-
tional. 
A strong political enables the policy 
maker to have better control of the in-
struments and use it for its own goals. A 
support to this statement can be found in 
the fact that a strong government steering 
can occur by many different instruments: 
with formula (UK, Norway), direct top-
down appointing (Netherlands) and pro-
ject funding (Switzerland). On the con-
trary, the Italian case shows that as politi-
cal will is weak and not stable, the in-
strument activates automatisms that make 
it evolve and influence also other aspects 
of the academic life. For instance, the in-
troduction of a component for research in 
the formula made the simple input meas-
ures not more suitable and spurred the 
development of a nationwide peer review 
evaluation process of scientific produc-
tion. The evaluation process provided re-
liable information, and favoured the 
growth of the share of funding allocated 
via formula. A virtuous cycle is emerg-
ing. The instrument influences the future 
choices of the policy maker and the de-
sign of new instruments in the future.   
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Table 1 –Funding instrument mix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Formula Contract Project funding 
 
most im-
portant 
funding 
subject 
% of HE 
public 
funding 
allocated 
by  the 
formula 
teaching research level
% of HE 
public 
funding 
allocated 
by con-
tract 
detail level 
% of HE 
public 
funding 
allocated 
by re-
search 
project 
academic 
free 
thematic 
- goal 
oriented 
Norway national government 45% 
simple in-
put/output* 
(47%) 
PhD, attrac-
tion of 
funding, 
productivity 
(53%) 
no national 1% strong weak 
Portugal national government 90% 
measure of 
efficiency 
and produc-
tivity 
no 
development multiyear  
contracts with HEIs that 
adopted the foundation 
model (3 universities), 
for other universities a 
marginal share of public 
funds is allocated 
through development 
contracts for specific ob-
jectives(e.g., quality im-
provement of teaching...) 
national 3% strong weak 
Italy national government 7% 
output and  
discipline 
coverage 
ratios (66%) 
connected 
to input and 
evaluation 
process re-
sults (33%) 
no national 3% strong weak 
Germany Länder variable - large 
mild simple input - output 
indicators regional
medium - some 
strategic task Federal 12% 
strong - excellence 
initiative 
France national government 
marginal 
-flows 
through 
the con-
tract 
simple in-
put/output 
(100%) 
no national 70%
high - 
bargaing 
not top 
down 
national 30% 
strong: 
cnrs la-
belling 
(20%), 
ANR 
medium; 
from dif-
ferent 
ministries
Switzerland Cantons large share 70% 30% regional tasks
top 
down Federal 21% strong strong 
UK 
national 
government 
(through 
state agen-
cies) 
59% 
simple in-
put/output 
(75%) 
(25%) con-
nected to 
evaluation 
process  
no national 29% 
embedded both in 
research councils 
mission 
Netherlands national government 90% 
simple 
output (50%) 
simple out-
put, but 
large part is 
actually 
historical 
(50%) 
no national 10% strong medium
*numbers of students, credits and degree certificates 
Source: designed by the authors 
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There is also the case of a country with 
strong government in which the instru-
ment produces unintended effects, by 
modifying the government role. This is 
the case of France: the contract was ini-
tially linked to a small amount of fund-
ing, but gradually became more impor-
tant, and empowered university level by 
creating a more symmetrical relation with 
the state. 
The issue of the most relevant 
government level seems to be associated 
with the choice of the instrument. It is 
observed that in the countries where the 
regional level of government is very 
important, Germany and Switzerland, 
then contracts are set between 
Länder/Cantons and the HEIs, while the 
Federal government mainly funds 
through projects. 
5.2 Quality assurance 
QA started as a separate instrument in 
university management in half 80s, taking 
inspiration from business practices of 
quality control. Many elements spurred 
this process in the HE: massification 
weakened the traditional tools of control; 
the rise of the managerial narrative with 
concepts such as: autonomy, deregula-
tion, steering at a distance, emphasis on 
efficiency and demand for accountability. 
QA was an alternative to the former strict 
bureaucratic control giving more room 
for institutional autonomy. Pioneers in 
Western Europe were countries such as 
UK and the Netherlands. QA spread 
around Europe, often by a mimicking 
process oriented toward other national 
experiences that were esteemed to be an 
optimal benchmark. The diffusion of QA 
accelerated between late 90s and early 
2000s mainly as a consequence of the Bo-
logna Process and the successive declara-
tions (table 2). 
HE debate in the 90s was characterised 
by multiple national frames on quality 
problems (Reichert). The globalisation 
and the Bologna process seemed to bring 
new energy and direction to the QA. The 
Bologna declaration spurred new initia-
tives especially as to accreditation 
schemes (Schwarz and Westerheijden, 
2004; Eurydice, 2010). One of the most 
important initiatives was the creation of 
the European Association for Quality As-
surance in Higher Education (ENQA) in 
2004 followed by the agreement on 
European Standards and Guidelines for 
Quality Assurance (ESG, 2005) in the 
European Agencies dealing with QA 
(EHEA), and the creation of a European 
Quality Assurance Register (EQAR, 
2008).  
Table 2 - Main Phases in the diffusion of QA in western Europe 
 
half 80s until half 90s late 90 s 2003 on wards 
 
Pioneers mimicking QA practic-
es in business sector  
 
Influence of the NPM narrative 
Main pioneers: UK and the 
Netherlands  
 
1994 EU pilot study-> influ-
ences the design of QA sistem in 
some European countries 
 
Bologna declaration triggers changes 
in the HE system and debate on the 
need of QA systems mimicking pio-
neers according tonational trajecto-
ries: Portugal-Dutch; Norway - Swe-
den 
 
Reforms of the QA system in the 
Netherlands, France, Germany, Nor-
way, Italy. Bergen, Berlin and Lon-
don meetings increase the role of the 
EU level in the QA still large nation-
al path dependence, though ENQA, 
EQAR, ESG: accreditation of QA 
agencies, soft steering, metaevalua-
tion  
Source: designed by the authors  
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Table 3 – Main orientation of the QA systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: designed by the authors 
 
 
The Register aims at enhancing trust and 
confidence in European HE by listing 
quality assurance agencies operating in 
Europe, which have proven their credibil-
ity and reliability in a review against the 
Guidelines4. The ESG comprises a set of 
standards for agencies that wish to be 
considered as trustworthy and profes-
sional in the performance of their func-
tions in the EHEA, irrespective of their 
structure, function and size and the na-
tional system in which they operate. ESG 
stresses stakeholder interest, institutional 
autonomy and minimum burden on 
higher education institutions.  
European cooperation in QA also occurs 
at discipline and professional levels. For 
instance, although there is no formal ob-
ligation in France nor in the UK to regis-
ter in order to practice as a professional 
engineer, in both countries the established 
standards provide a strong incentive for 
the accreditation of engineering degree 
programmes. In Portugal accreditation of 
engineering programmes by the Order of 
Engineers has preceded general QA pro-
cedures. Engineering has always been in 
the forefront of discipline-specific ac-
creditation. Quality processes, especially 
if tied to improvement, need to be more 
discipline specific, especially when sup-
                                                                    
                                                                   
4  After the inclusion of three QA agencies in 
2008, in 2009 they grew to 17. 
ply becomes wider, heterogeneous and 
market driven then State monitoring may 
prove to become cost consuming and less 
effective. Indeed, the “engineering” 
model can be (and in some cases is) used 
as a pilot for other professional disci-
plines (Augusti et al.)5 
Different actors, contexts and levels 
shape QA policy instruments and tech-
niques. We can try to point out the main 
changes occurred in the last decade (Tab. 
3). Continental countries (France, Italy, 
Norway, and Germany) have seen tradi-
tionally a major role of the state / land, 
with focus on accreditation and a stronger 
equality orientation. Thus, the main goals 
of accreditation were to control the evolu-
tion of the system and to grant similar 
quality standards across the HEIs.  
At present we face a common trend to-
ward 'intermediation' in QA, with agen-
cies between HEIs and the central gov-
ernment, but the power and autonomy of 
the agencies largely depends on the kind 
of relationship with the State. In France 
 
5  In 2004 the European Network for 
Accreditation of Engineering Education - ENAEE 
promoted the EUR-ACE (EURopean ACredited 
Engineer) project, that was completed on 2006. 
The “EUR-ACE Framework Standards” do not 
intend to substitute national standards, but to 
provide a common reference framework as the 
basis for the award of a common European quality 
label (the EUR-ACE label). 
Main orientation  
of the QA system Countries 
Evaluation 
Portugal 
Switzerland 
UK 
Accreditation 
France  
Germany  
Italy  
Norway 
Accreditation,  
evaluation The Netherlands 
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and Italy agencies are established mainly 
for organizational purposes; in Norway a 
compromise is visible, the State still has a 
supervision of the process but its influ-
ence is less pervasive; in Germany the 
agencies are becoming the main foci of 
the QA assurance process, in which the 
stakeholders confront. The different be-
haviour of Germany seems to depend on 
two main factors: the first is that Länder 
are not large enough to manage a modern 
comprehensive accreditation process, the 
second lies in the national well-rooted 
practice of involving all the most impor-
tant stakeholders in the decision process, 
which is now placed in new bodies like 
the Akkreditierungsrat and the agencies. 
Agencies are more protected and more 
independent, because they have many 
promoters (they are inter Länder and/ or 
inter universities agencies), and they in-
teract with an intermediary body (the 
Akkreditierun-gsrat) rather than directly 
with the Ministry. Functional and finan-
cial autonomy emerges, as well as orien-
tation toward the stakeholders and the 
market, while references to the compli-
ance of Akkreditierungrat’s statements 
are rare or nuanced6. Competition bee-
tween the agencies is emerging, even in 
an international arena: German agencies 
may accredit HEIs from other countries, 
and vice versa. Such competition in a 
market for accreditation may be closer to 
improvement orientation, since the main 
purpose is not assessing a minimum stan-
dard, rather to gain a label of quality 
                                                                    
6  From the AQUIN website “Degree pro-
grammes are evaluated by reason of their charac-
teristic purpose as well as on the basis of the 
quality criteria developed and applied by the 
agency’ ‘(the agency) operates as a non-profit 
organisation which is financed through member-
ship fees as well as through HEIs for accredita-
tion services provided’ 'main objective is to pro-
vide guidance and information for students, em-
ployers and higher education institutions and to 
contribute to more transparency in the market of 
study programmes’,‘' the agency serves quality 
assurance in an open education market’ 
whose prestige depend on the prestige of 
the agency.  
In sum, in the group of continental coun-
tries the interaction of managerial and 
Bologna principles generate different re-
sponses. Germany: change in the para-
digm of control; Italy and France: new 
bureaucratic orientation, or neo-weberian, 
Norway: softer ministry control. Ger-
many seems to be developing a unique 
system with an overall meta-accreditation 
on the top and an increasingly relevant 
market-oriented quality assurance on the 
bottom, which is less oriented on equality 
and more oriented to excellence and 
competition. Hood et al. (2004) already 
pointed out that in Germany a change in 
the control model was occurring, from 
autonomy and mutuality (subject specific 
and cross disciplinary) toward competi-
tion and oversight; our observation seems 
to show that even some oversight have 
partially changed into competition. On 
the contrary, after a phase of more flexi-
bility, Italy and France are shifting to 
centralized steering again, even if in dif-
ferent ways. The devolution process in 
Italy may in the future change the context 
again and favour a German like system, 
especially as the meta-accreditation of the 
EQAR becomes widespread.   
A second group comprises the Dutch sys-
tem and Switzerland. QA processes have 
a long-standing tradition in the first coun-
try, while they are more recent in the lat-
ter. Major responsibility for QA is up to 
the universities, and quality control is ex-
erted in the type of mutuality within insti-
tutions (Hood et al., 2004), still the State / 
Canton monitoring is strong, and often 
occurs in a non formalized way. Recent 
years have seen rising competences of the 
new agencies. Major goals were similar: 
increasing the visibility of the system' 
quality, increasing efficiency, providing 
information for students, faculty and poli-
cy makers.  
The third group is composed of the two 
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countries where HEIs traditionally en-
joyed full autonomy and the system is 
more market-oriented: UK and Portugal. 
One common goal of QA in these sys-
tems is to increase the reputation of the 
institution; professionals are also an im-
portant promoter of QA processes. There 
are some differences. In the UK these 
practices were introduced to improve 
control of public spending and account-
ability. A shift toward the agency oc-
curred, which is in part influenced by the 
government. In Portugal QA initiatives 
have been promoted and managed largely 
by the public HEIs themselves through 
the CRUP, in order to affirm their quality 
standards vis a vis the private HEIs.  
The most recent European initiatives, 
such as ENQA, ESG and EQAR, all have 
the main focus in the agency and softly 
hints at improvement. ESG favours con-
vergence on the meta-evaluation systems 
and promotes a common space where 
members, evaluators and HEIs can con-
front on methods and techniques for ac-
creditation. The effects of European pres-
sures have been not homogeneous. In 
some cases they produced an increased 
role of the agencies and more independ-
ence (Norway, Germany, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands). In France the EHEA 
emerges as an escamotage to reform and 
re-legitimate a centralized steering, ac-
creditation and evaluation system. In Italy 
the introduction of the new degree system 
had a dramatic centrifugal effect; at that 
point, there was not the political will to 
choose the market as the new source of 
status and order, on the contrary the State 
retained this role through a renewed cen-
tralized and bureaucratic-like control. 
Increasingly, government accreditation 
coexists with accreditations promoted by 
various stakeholders' group; the risk of 
evaluation overload and overlapping be-
tween various accreditation and evalua-
tion processes (Schade, 2004) exists both 
for State led countries (with a problem of 
bureaucratic expansion in Italy, France, 
and Norway), as well as where market 
and agency led ones, with a multitude of 
agencies labelling quality and standards 
(UK, Portugal, Germany).  
Some similarities can be detected be-
tween QA and funding. Also in the case 
QA, a strong and persistent political will 
is associated with a better control of the 
instrument; in France QA become cen-
tralized by using the lever of the EHEA 
process; in the Netherlands QA practices 
have been established since a long time, 
while in the UK they have been consoli-
dated despite a strong tradition of institu-
tional and academic autonomy. On the 
contrary, Italian unstable policy leader-
ship has favoured an escalation of control 
vs buffering and opportunism, and even 
growing bureaucratic and stringent con-
trol. The prevalence of the regional level 
of government, in the case of Germany 
favours a partial lose of control of the 
oversight in favour of market like form of 
control.   
5.3 Evaluation of research as a steering 
tool  
The government’s need to steer research 
activity developed by the HEIs emerged 
through out the second half of the XX 
century, and initially focused on condi-
tional selection and monitoring of re-
search projects according to their likely 
contribution to national strategic objec-
tives. In most countries investment in 
prospective evaluation guiding resource 
allocation was much greater than invest-
ment in retrospective evaluation of the re-
sults. As state funding for research stabi-
lized since early 70’, pressure for effi-
ciency increased. Since early ’80, NPM 
narrative favoured the emergence of a 
new relationship between a state ‘super-
visor’ that sets goals in terms of efficacy 
and thematic priorities, and more 
autonomous HEIs. This process further 
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spurred practices to make universities ac-
countable, judge to what extent goals 
have been achieved, and to correctly allo-
cate resources. During the ’90 and ‘00, 
increased attention was put on ex post 
evaluation, both regarding project results 
as well as HEIs productivity through re-
search assessment exercises in the frame 
of formula funding systems.  
Whitley (2007) defines Research evalua-
tion systems (RES) as “organised sets of 
procedures for assessing the merits of re-
search undertaken in publicly-funded or-
ganizations that are implemented on a 
regular basis, by state or state delegated 
agencies”. Evaluation systems can be dis-
tinguished according to their frequency, 
formalization, standardization and trans-
parency (of procedures and criteria). 
These features usually occurs together: 
evaluation in continental European coun-
tries have been usually informal, on disci-
plinary basis, process neither results being 
published; in other countries the process is 
more frequent, formal, standardised and 
transparent (it is the case of the British 
RAE). Six features affect the functioning 
of the evaluation system, and most of them 
are linked to the characteristics of the 
funding system (Whitley, 2007): 
- High frequency and significance of 
project performance review7.  
- The incorporation of varied policy 
goals in funding procedures8.  
- Variety of funding agencies and their 
goals. 
- Organizational independence and ca-
pabilities of HEIs. 
                                                                    
7 Higher frequency increases the importance of 
performance based funding and the costs of 
project failure, while in block-grant funding 
regimes the ability to conduct research does not 
depend on performance in the short-medium term 
8 When they are distinct from intellectual ones, 
they limit the concentration of control of the 
academic elites 
- Cohesion and prestige of scientific el-
ites in each society. 
- Segmentation of HEIs in terms of fund-
ing, objectives and labour markets.  
Whitley analyses how the variation in 
these features affect the impact of evalua-
tion system on knowledge production. It 
is also plausible that the variation of some 
of these features would also play a role in 
the evolution and implementation of the 
RES itself. For instance, we may expect 
that strong and cohesive scientific elites 
will be more likely to avoid the inclusion 
of external stakeholders in the evaluation 
process, to avoid full shift towards bibli-
ometric evaluation (at least in some disci-
plines). 
Hicks (2009) studies the evolution of 
evaluation of research exercises in US, 
UK and Australia; three countries with a 
quite long tradition of research evalua-
tion. In US, magazines and independent 
bodies assess the research quality, while 
in UK and Australia evaluation occurs on 
government mandate. The author identi-
fies some common themes in the evolu-
tion of the instruments. There is a tension 
between increasing complexity and need 
for practicality; complexity emerges as 
response to pressures for fairness across 
heterogeneous academic disciplines, and 
easily increases because of the absence of 
any accounting of the exercise’ full cost. 
Excessive complexity put the evaluation 
at risks or make it even fail: in UK the 
Research assessment Exercise (RAE) 
submissions’ burden has risen questions 
about the cost/benefit ratio of the exercise 
(Geuna, Martin 2003); the aim at assess-
ing group level excellence (in Australia) 
and tracking each researcher scientific 
productivity (US) have not been accom-
plished. Thus, there seems to be a con-
vergence towards peer informed, metrics 
based, departmental level evaluation; 
which may represent a kind of compro-
mise between complexity and practical-
ity. The move from peer review to bibli-
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ometric is difficult, and it is more likely 
the opposite (as in Australia). Attention to 
evaluation is high, although only mar-
ginal share of revenues is affected: for in-
stance, despite 20% of government re-
sources is allocated through RAE results, 
actually the median impact on university 
budget was only 0.6% (Hicks 2009 citing 
Sastry and Bekhradnia, 2006). Greater 
scientific productivity seems to be 
achieved at the cost of evaluation, which 
is presumably less than the cost of in-
creasing research funding. 
The quoted literature show that evalua-
tion most often does not emerge as an in-
dependent government led instrument, 
rather as accessorial to a funding instru-
ment that aims at allocation according to 
performance in research activity and co-
herence with the governmental/academic 
goals. Despite its initial dependence on 
the funding process, evaluation may rise 
as the most powerful component of the 
policy, as shown by the RAE case, or 
even as an independent instrument with 
indirect effects on funding, as in the case 
of the Netherlands. 
The type of instruments used and their 
evolution may be very useful to under-
stand the underlying policy goals and the 
relationship between governor and gov-
erned subjects. Though, instruments are 
not always completely under policy 
maker control: they may autonomously 
produce unintended effect and trigger a 
series of changes. Thus, it is not easy to 
set with certainty when changing instru-
ments is actually the outcome of a policy 
rationale or rather a process that depends 
on other factors too. The case of the use 
of research assessment exercise well il-
lustrates this point.  
Ex post research evaluation occurs in 
many countries but research assessment 
exercise only occurs in large countries, 
where the main funder is the national 
government and formula is the preferred 
allocation tool. Italy and UK possess all 
these three relevant features. Norway and 
Portugal are small countries, the assess-
ment exercise may seem too costly, and 
conflicts of interest may be difficult to 
eliminate, given the smaller size of the 
academic community. In the Netherlands 
evaluation occurs but does not affect al-
location, it is not organized to evaluate 
HEI or department level, rather as disci-
pline focused and oriented to provide in-
formation to political and academic lead-
ership; the use of evaluation' results is 
flexible and discussed together with the 
subjects under evaluation. In this case, 
rather than the size of the country, other 
factors seem to ease other solutions for 
steering. Netherlands is a country where 
NPM reform had a strong impact, but 
with some relevant differences compared 
to the UK: the ‘steering at the distance 
principle’ is complemented with an im-
portant role of the State in the process to 
select the academic leadership, while 
British universities are completely 
autonomous in this sense. The relation-
ship between Ministry and academic 
leadership is based on cooperation rather 
then on ‘assessment and control’ princi-
ple; disciplinary evaluation not directly 
influencing allocation seems to be apt for 
this relationship. German Länder and 
Swiss Cantons are also too small to jus-
tify an assessment exercise at that level. 
Moreover contract seems to prevent both 
regional and nation wide assessment 
linked to allocation, since local and na-
tional governments prefers direct interac-
tion that are based on more information 
and grants more freedom.  
Other general observations can be outlined 
by the analysis of evaluation practices.  
As we say, in most countries evaluation 
was introduced in order to support other 
steering instruments, mainly funding 
ones. This represented a first move away 
from the traditional Humbold approach of 
complete academic freedom. Still, 
evaluation was initially done by academ-
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ics and steering instruments privileged 
fundamental research: the major aim was 
that of a more efficient allocation. A step 
forward in the steering of research is rep-
resented by the increasing involvement of 
policy makers and stakeholders in the 
evaluation process, which both points out 
the recognition of the powerful potential 
of evaluation and the will to gain direct 
voice on the choice of research goals. In 
some cases, policy makers even promote 
the establishment of a specific and stable 
agency for evaluation. This initiative may 
reflect the will to further enhance policy 
maker steering, and to secure evaluation 
activity from future political rethinking 
and academic influence. Though, evalua-
tion has proved to be very effective, be-
cause the information flow is appreciated 
by researchers and results impact their 
reputation. This happens when the 
evaluator is competent (for instance, pres-
tigious peers), and when criteria and 
methodology are shared; these elements 
will help academics disposition to inter-
nalize such external pressure. RAE in UK 
is a good example, since the HEFCs ap-
point many prestigious academics to 
manage the evaluation exercise, criteria 
are clear and set after a deep participatory 
process of discussion. Nevertheless, as in 
the case of QA the presence of a dedi-
cated Agency might favour the institu-
tionalization of evaluation, with the risk 
of routine and bureaucratization, reducing 
rather enforcing its efficacy. Evaluation 
appears to be resilient and self-enforcing, 
it tend to become an autonomous instru-
ment, more elaborated and complex 
through out time. The case of Italy shows 
that despite a weak and unstable political 
will, when evaluation enters in the dis-
course and rhetoric of HE management it 
does not leave easily (Reale, Seeber, 
2011). Rather then bureaucratization 
through and agency, the most effective 
initiative to secure evaluation and its effi-
cacy may well be evaluation itself. 
5.4 The resistible rise of rankings 
The diffusion and success of university 
rankings is relatively recent. At the be-
ginning they were not directly created as 
steering tools, rather published by news-
paper, or they are merely one of the out-
puts of evaluation processes. The instru-
ment rose in the Anglo Saxon HE market 
(USA) and quasi-market (UK), then the 
mass media favoured its diffusion in the 
continental HE systems, which were be-
coming mass and managerial systems. 
There are main different explanations for 
the emergence of the ranking and their 
impact at macro level as well as at insti-
tutional level (Stensaker and Kehm, 
2009). As to the former, rankings might 
emerge as regulation tool in the quasi-
market, due to the hollowing out of the 
State; or, in the frame of the globaliza-
tion process, where HE is increasingly 
seen just as another economic sector, 
rankings provide information to con-
sumers in an international market; or 
rankings can be an outcome of the audit 
society: massification requires new in-
struments for accountability. As to ex-
planations for the institutional level, one 
might be the institutional identity crea-
tion: in a race for prestige and position in 
the academic order (Dill and Soo, 2005) 
rankings provide institutions with pres-
tige; another explanation see ranking as 
a symptom of the emerging knowledge 
society and the tendency to emphasise 
certain dimension of knowledge produc-
tion. 
Sauder et al. (2009) focus on the meso 
and micro level factors to explain why 
rankings have permeated law schools in 
US so extensively and why these organi-
zations have been unable to buffer. They 
use Foucault’s conception of discipline 
(Foucault, 1978) through two important 
processes: surveillance and normaliza-
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tion.9 Some environmental pressures are 
less “decouple-able” than others because 
of the organization’ member disposition 
to internalize external pressures: cogni-
tive and emotional factors mediate or 
amplify these pressures.  Despite rank-
ings are harshly criticized and disap-
proved by most academics and faculty 
deans, they have proven to be generative. 
Three factors facilitate internalization:  
 
- Anxiety: rankings are engines of status 
uncertainty. Personal judgement of in-
stitutional prestige is fuzzy but rather 
stable, it is difficult that HEI reputa-
tion can change rapidly in peoples’ 
mind. On the contrary, rankings create 
a kind of clearer view, where positions 
can rapidly shift.   
- Resistance: individuals and organiza-
tions never fit into the particular iden-
tity that discipline imposes, so they of-
ten try to resist. Though, resistance fa-
cilitates the internalization of disci-
pline because it expresses an invest-
ment in a relationship, that makes 
rankings “a point of reference around 
which action and beliefs are organi-
zed”. 
- Allure: it emerges from the desire to 
tame raking, for instance by manipu-
lating data; it is a symbolic response 
but at the same time the hegemony of 
ranking is also reinforced.  
 
The success of ranking might also be ex-
plained by the need that humans have of 
 
9 “Rankings create a public, stable system of 
stratification comprised of unstable positions. The 
result is a social structure exquisitely suited for 
generating anxiety, uncertainty, meticulous 
monitoring, and discipline. Processes of 
normalization and surveillance change how 
members make sense of their organizations, their 
work, and their relations to peers. In this way, 
abstract systems become embedded in 
organizations and embodied in members and are 
the reason why organizations cannot buffer the 
effects of rankings” (Sauder et al., 2009).  
cognitive maps that help them making 
sense and order of a complex environ-
ment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; 
Taleb, 2007). Such human attitude has 
been studies also in Science, in the need 
for paradigm that can support scientific 
research; a paradigm crisis spurs an im-
mediate search for an new one (Kuhn, 
1962). We can point out three main fea-
tures that determine the success of a nar-
rative (an interpretation, a paradigm, 
etc.), that are outlined in a similar way by 
Kuhn for the analysis of scientific para-
digms:  
 
- Perceived adherence to reality (the fact 
that the paradigm fail to foresee ex-
perimental results may undermine its 
credibility).  
- Degree of detail, which actually influ-
ences how extensively can be used 
(the paradigm is useful and used until 
it can be used to solve new problems; 
narrative outside science does not nec-
essary need to help solving new prob-
lems forever).   
- Simplicity, which influences how eas-
ily can be communicated and shared 
by many different users (the Ptolemaic 
system was still able to make correct 
prevision when the Copernican system 
succeeded because of its much greater 
simplicity).  
We often replace elaborated but fuzzy 
cognitive map with wrong but clear ones. 
Kahneman reports an enlightening tale on 
this issue that resumes some observation 
made through his and Tversky’s work 
(FORA.tv, 2009):   
A group of scouts gets lost in the Alps; after 
three days they come back. The chief of the 
camp ask them.  
C: “how did you manage to come back?”  
S: “we were desperate but finally we found 
this map.” 
C: “but this is a map of the Pyrenees!” 
S: “yes, but it is a map!” 
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Figure 4 – Criteria driving the adoption of a cognitive map 
 
 
 
                                Source: designed by the authors 
 
Moreover, when many people are in-
volved, having one view of reality may 
reduce bargain and conflicts, even when 
the limits of such view are evident. This 
view will be resilient, unless and alterna-
tive view with a comparable degree of de-
tail and simplicity is provided; the char-
acteristics of the problem and users will 
influence the importance and use of each 
narrative. This may be the case for rank-
ings; individual academics have elabo-
rated and complex ideas on institutional 
prestige but they are not formalized and 
difficult to communicate, focused the dis-
cipline they work. They will go on mak-
ing reference to their experience for their 
work, but they have to make reference to 
rankings when communicating with out-
siders. The less skilled the audience the 
simpler will be the cognitive map; the 
adoption of ranking is also decided by 
university outsiders, users such as stu-
dents, their families, policy makers, etc. 
that may be the reason why ranking ap-
pear to be crude to academics.  
A wide literature describes the pro and 
cons of the rankings. Many authors point 
out that rankings have had a surprisingly 
deep impact on the HE sector, which is 
traditionally stable and elitist; despite 
their limits, they are likely to exist and 
diffuse also in the future. Moreover, dif-
ferent kinds of rankings have had differ-
ent impact on the considered countries 
There are three main types, which are 
oriented to different audiences: a) Rank-
ings published by newspapers with a fo-
cus on teaching and national level; target: 
students and their families. Their impact 
on students' choices is uncertain and ac-
cording to many studies it is not large; b) 
International rankings published by uni-
versities or newspapers with a focus on 
research activity and institutional pres-
tige. Target: academics, policy makers, 
other stakeholders; c) Rankings published 
by institutions or evaluation agencies. 
They often resume the results of assess-
ment exercises. Target: academics, policy 
makers, other stakeholders.  
The responses to rankings of policy mak-
ers, HEIs and academics may be very dif-
ferent, as well as the relationship between 
existing rankings. In UK, for instance, 
rankings published by the newspaper 
have developed quite simultaneously with 
governmental rankings; they appear to be 
a associated with the rise of quasi-market 
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in HE and they receive great attention in 
the system. In the case of Italy newspa-
pers' rankings emerged in late nineties to 
inform students. Government does not 
diffuse information on teaching assess-
ment process; only in recent times a rank-
ing produced by the Ministry of Univer-
sity and Research level was published, 
including both teaching and research 
evaluation results. 
The impact of rankings on academics has 
been widely studied, while the impact on 
policy-making is much more uncertain. 
Rankings may generate useful informa-
tion, as in the case of ranking produced 
by research assessment exercises (Italy, 
UK), and support the concentration of re-
sources in order to improve rankings and 
efficiency (UK). In Germany, the results 
of the international rankings produced 
concern among policy makers and aca-
demics on the low standings of German 
HEIs; there was a reaction by the policy 
makers oriented to spur excellence, and 
also by academics to develop a new ap-
proach that may correct some of the 
drawbacks of the existing rankings (see, 
for instance CHE ranking – Brandenburg 
2009). In other case the use of rankings as 
a policy instrument that can inform, sup-
port or justify policy initiatives is not 
even contemplated. The implementation 
of rankings as policy instruments needs to 
be better explored, in order to understand: 
which actors spur their use, which ele-
ments may favour or limit use, diffusion 
and impact in different national contexts. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we investigate policy im-
plementation in HE by looking at the evo-
lution of some policy instruments, 
namely formula funding, project funding, 
quality assurance and research evaluation. 
Moreover, we take into account the rise 
of ranking as a new instrument adopted 
by policy makers. Our research wants to 
understand: to what extent instruments 
can reveal the evolution of policy ration-
ales and justifications; whether and how 
they evolve in unpredictable ways, gener-
ating unexpected results, playing new 
roles and functionalities, how instruments 
emerged, and become institutionalised, 
affecting and being affected by the char-
acteristics of national configurations of 
HE systems. The work is developed 
within the TRUE project, adopting a 
comparative and diachronic perspective; 
limitations of the analysis derive from the 
need to control the results through strong 
empirical evidences at government and 
institutional levels. 
Beside the aforementioned limitations, 
some interesting results can be outlined.  
The evolution of the HE funding instru-
ments shows some similar features across 
the European system considered by the 
TRUE project.  Among the innovative 
funding instruments of the last decades 
there are: the use of formula, specific 
contracts between government and each 
institution for the allocation of basic re-
sources (or extra resources), and the use 
of project funding for research activity. 
Formula, contract and project emerge as 
instruments for a more efficient allocation 
and, in second instance, as steering tools. 
They imply a change in the relationship 
between the state and the universities, as 
the role of the state changes from regula-
tor to supervisor of universities autono-
mous on procedural matters. Once acti-
vated, such instruments are not fully in 
control of the policy maker, rather they 
interact and partially bound state choices 
also in the future. This happens also be-
cause when the state begins to steer HEIs, 
it also legitimates them as relevant actor 
of the system and they become fledged 
active counterparts. 
Evaluation rises as independent steering 
instruments mostly as to QA and ex post 
research assessment exercises, but affects 
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countries in different ways. Moreover, the 
origin of the instruments and the drivers 
of change are different, with the Euro-
pean processes playing a leading role as 
to the former, while the latter is mostly 
linked to the national political initiative 
and affected by path dependence. On the 
other hand, rankings are emerging as a 
powerful instrument not originated by a 
policy initiative, whose diffusion and im-
pact on HEIs seem remarkable. Policy 
makers are joining the game, making 
formally or informally reference to rank-
ings as justification for different policy 
initiatives (such as the excellence initia-
tive in Germany), but a formal use in pol-
icy making is not evident yet. 
The capability of the policy maker to 
manage the instrument depends on his 
strong and persistent political will, and on 
capability to bargain with universities. 
The development of the considered in-
struments has been often inspired by 
NPM principles, which aimed at increas-
ing steering capacity of the policy maker 
on one side, and university role and 
autonomy on the other. The common nar-
rative is then declined in very different 
ways among countries, and instruments 
reveal the extent to which it is adapted to 
the existing characters of the HE system. 
For instance, an ongoing ‘agencyfication’ 
process for managing policy instruments 
is visible in most countries, but in some 
case the possibility is to give rise to bu-
reaucratisation and routine processes, 
weakening the steering capability of the 
instruments. Moreover, there have been 
different starting points across European 
countries, which strongly influenced the 
evolutionary path of instruments. It is still 
unclear the degree of convergence be-
tween countries, and whether present 
configurations are stable or they are a 
step toward a further convergence or a 
new diversification phase. Much might 
depend on the intensity of the European 
integration process that in cases such as 
the QA has been the mean and the trigger 
of the way the instrument has been put 
into action. 
Finally, the chosen mix of policy instru-
ments used in the considered countries 
seems to be affected at the same time by 
traditions linked to the national configu-
rations, and by the need of a rationalisa-
tion of the HE system, with the rein-
forcement of HEIs as autonomous, strong 
and tightly coupled organisations. Differ-
ent implementation of the instruments in 
the mix might contribute to produce un-
expected and unintended results for steer-
ing the HEIs. Further empirical research 
is needed in order to outline the impor-
tance of the instruments in terms of in-
vestment of resources and symbolic val-
ues, the political discourse for their im-
plementation, the degree of novelty of the 
instruments themselves according to the 
national experience, the role of the differ-
ent actors involved (government, inter-
mediaries, buffers and academics), the 
impact on HEIs and the transformations 
of the instrument (modifications of the 
design, changes in the functioning, mis-
application) deriving from interactions 
between policy layers and the HEIs. 
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ANNEX 1 
 Formula, Project and contracts QA and Research Evaluation 
 
 
GERMANY 
 
 
90% of HE funding comes from the Länder, which have 
legal responsibility for the HEIs, the contents and or-
ganization of studies, as well as quality. Allocation is 
largely based on historical value but a variable share of 
the budget is linked to performance, measured through 
simple input measures of enrolment, teaching and some-
time research activity (third party funding). Basic fund-
ing is decreasing, while program-linked earmarked fund-
ing is increasing. The relationship between HEIs and 
regional government is symmetrical, nevertheless there 
are contract agreements mostly focused on educational 
productivity (Lepori et al. 2005).  
The most important funding initiative of the federal go-
vernement is the ‘Excellence initiative’, a response to 
the concern on the relative low ranks of German HEIs in 
international rankings. The initiative aims at spurring 
excellence, both in terms of academic and of socio-
economic outcomes, by bringing universities and re-
search institutions closer together around ‘cluster of ex-
cellence’. Federal level stresses academic-industry col-
laboration. The Federal government also funds projects 
through 4 agencies (OECD, 2007).  
 
 
The QA system was based on approval of the programmes 
according to framework regulations. This system was ineffi-
cient and it has been replaced: there was a shift from approval 
to accreditation as a precondition for approval. Accreditation 
of study programmes is carried out by accreditation Agencies, 
who in turn are accredited by the cross- Länder accreditation 
council (Akkreditierungsrat), which also defines the basic re-
quirements of the process. The legal basis of the accreditation 
system is set out in the Law. All stakeholders must be involved 
in the agencies. Akkreditierungsrat takes into account the 
European standards (ESG). German HEIs may be accredited 
also by agencies from other countries. Agencies’ mission 
statements often emphasize independency and market orienta-
tion, rather than compliance with Akkreditierungrat’s stan-
dards. Thus, the top-down basic supervision is complemented 
by a competitive orientation toward the market.  
Evaluation of teaching was introduced in mid 90s to support 
HEIs in the quality promoting. There is not a national institu-
tion to coordinate evaluation activities; there are initiatives at 
Land, regional, and cross regional level between HEIs.  
Evaluation of research is accessorial to funding procedures. 
There is not an ex post evaluation process. 
 
 
NORWAY 
 
 
The main public funder of the HE system is the national 
government. The basic component is about 55 per cent 
of university budgets, the rest is allocated through a 
formula: Education component 21%, Research compo-
nent accounts 24%(Sletta, 2007; Frølich, 2009).  More 
complex research output indicator have been gradually 
introduced. Substantial growth in publication and impact 
have been noted since the introduction of the new for-
mula (Lepori et al 2005; OECD, 2007). 
A small portion of funds is allocated through competi-
tive grants are allocated by the Research Council and 
other minor bodies; free projects have a declining role 
compared to programmes promoting specific research 
issues (Slipersæter et al., 2007 ; Potì and Reale, 2007).   
 
 
The Bologna process inspired an important reform process. In 
2003 a new system of accreditation was introduced: an inde-
pendent accreditation agency was created (NOKUT); formal 
accreditation schemes were introduced; each HEIs should es-
tablish a functioning quality assurance system. Accreditation 
regards institutions as well as programmes. Accreditation is 
based on a mix of self evaluation and external review, with the 
publication of a report. NOKUT decides on accreditation and 
the decision is sent to the ministry for final approval. NOKUT 
also evaluates the HEIs' internal quality assurance systems. 
The creation of the NOKUT represents a decentralization 
compared to the previous arrangement, even if the Ministry 
still has the final say on institutional status. 
Research evaluation plays an accessorial role in the frame of 
the formula funding (bibliometric techniques) and in project 
funding, where in some disciplines may be a signal of academ-
ic prestige.  
 
 
FRANCE 
 
 
The central government plays a key role. Formula exists 
since 1968. Contracts between state and HEIs have been 
established since 1991, based on student number and 
specific priorities, they determine 70% of the university 
public funding. An increasing share of university budg-
ets (20% in 2005)  flows directly to research labs with-
out universities having any role (Frølich 2008). The 
emergence of universities as central actors can be asso-
ciated with the steering by contract. Negotiation partially 
changed the nature of the relationship with the State, 
from hierarchical to more symmetrical (Musselin and 
Paradise, 2009). much of research is done in mixed re-
search units, with academic and Cnrs personnel. Units 
are selected by a national committee through a ‘label-
ling’ process, similar to the project funding selection 
process (Theves et al. 2007). The Agence Nationale de 
la Recherche (ANR) has been recently created to reor-
ganize and enhance the national competitive allocation 
of research funding. A large share of funds still depend 
on the CRNS but ANR is getting more important. This 
new hybrid model may represents a step towards the 
European standard model of research funding (Theves et 
al., 2007).  
 
 
QA processes reflect the new paradigm of increasing institu-
tional autonomy. Programmes accreditation traditionally con-
sisted in complying with the ministerial regulations (confor-
mity check). In 2002, following Bologna declaration, the de-
gree structure changed: the ministry allowed universities to 
propose new programmes and the only guidance was the crite-
ria used for accreditation. The French minister of education 
saw in the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) the op-
portunity to reform the system. New degree structure and the 
threat of external competition from other countries has pushed 
all institutions towards a common degree structure and an ac-
creditation system that, given the weakness of the HEIs, can 
only be provided by the state (first though CNE, then since 
2006 though the AERES). HEIs should evaluate individuals.  
Research evaluation plays several roles: it is accessorial to 
contract, in order to assess the achievement of the goals by the 
HEIs; accessorial in the labelling process, supporting the se-
lection process and indirectly signalling a high quality stan-
dard. AERES is meant also to evaluate public research institu-
tions and teams. Evaluation process is based on self evaluation 
followed by external review on the basis of the  self evaluation 
report. Evaluation results influence the strategic decisions of 
the government and the academic leaderships.  
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UK 
 
HEIs receive 38% of their budget from the HEFCs, 24% 
from tuition fees, 16% from Research councils grants, 
22% from other incomes (for instance donation collected 
by charitable trust).  
Basic HE funding is organized at national level and the 
Ministry of education is responsible, but with 4 separate 
HEFCs that operate at the 4 regional (State) levels. 
Funding for teaching depends on number of students 
completing components of academic programs (63%); 
Funding for research (20%) is allocated on the basis of 
RAE results, that focus on: quality of research (70%), 
degree thesis supervision (15%) and charitable support 
(10%); minor components from competitive projects 
(6,3%) and earmarked capital funding (10,6%). The 
resulting block grant is determined and the universities 
are free to spend it. 
RAE tends to concentrate resources in excellent 
universities and departments. 
There are 8 disciplinary Research councils focusing on 
specific issues. 
 
 
British universities are responsible for the evaluation and 
approval of their own degrees. Professional bodies approve and 
recognize programmes that lead to professional qualification or 
licence to practice, but the university right to offer courses is 
not limited. On the contrary, individual autonomy has been 
eroded by collegial and increasingly managerial authority. 
National QA arrangements can be considered an aspect of that 
erosion. The Quality assurance agency (QAA), created in 1997, 
is responsible for the evaluation of the universities and to 
encourage continuous improvement. It does not make a direct 
judgement about the quality rather expresses the degree of 
confidence in the institution; such judgement may affect the 
institution’s reputation and the decision of the HE funding 
councils (HEFCs). Evaluation can be seen as a running battle 
between governments and university leaderships.  Externally 
monitored QA is now accepted by academics. 
The Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) is an ex post 
research evaluation process that aims at evaluating the research 
units in  the British HEIs; the focus of the evaluation is the 
scientific production along the different disciplinary sectors, it 
is based mainly on peer review. RAE provides to HEFCEs 
information for the allocation of funding. Evaluation' results 
also impact research practice and management.  
 
 
SWITZER-
LAND 
 
The university act (1999) aimed at creating shared 
steering of cantons and confederation:the Conference of 
Swiss universities (CUS) was reformed, academics were 
excluded and now it is composed exclusively by policy 
makers. Academic leadership is in charge of 
implementing CUS policies (Paradise et al., 2009). 
Funding system reflects this general goal. Cantons are 
the main funders of the university in their land, allocation 
is based on output criteria related to teaching (70%) and 
research (30%) activity (Lepori, 2006). The Federal 
government activity is growing. It funds the two Federal 
institutes of technology (FIT) and subsidizes the cantonal 
universities and the applied universities. Federal 
government also provides funds for the two main 
agencies for project funding. The Swiss National Science 
foundation (SNF) funds academic research, it is a private 
foundation managed by professors, but the Federal 
government may influence research subjects and 
selection of projects. The Commission for Technology 
and innovation (CTI) funds applied research and joint 
projects between universities and industries. The 
confederation plays a major role in project funding and 
increased strongly in the '90 (Lepori, 2006).  
Since the end of the 1980s, Switzerland has participated 
in the European Framework Programs on a project-by-
project basi 
 
 
QA assurance in Switzerland has rapidly evolved in the last 
decade. QA is considered to be the responsibility of 
universities themselves, as was officially established since 
2000. In 2003 the Centre of Accreditation and Quality 
Assurance of the Swiss Universities (OAQ), was requested by 
the CUS to control the QA system internal to each university. 
OAQ also publish guidelines and principles that should lead the 
definition of the internal QA systems, these principles are 
explicitly coherent with international standards and especially 
with ESG standards. Accreditation procedures were promoted 
since 2007 and they are also in charge of the OAQ. The aim is 
to verify that institutions and programs satisfy minimal quality 
standards; accreditation procedure is voluntary. 
Research evaluation occurs in the project funding selection 
process; it signals high quality standard and coherence with 
Federal goals. It also occurs to assess the achievement of goals 
set in the canton-HEIs agreements.  
 
PORTUGAL 
 
The funding system consists of 3 parts: teaching - 
formula; investment: Ministry’s approval of development 
plans; research: mainly project competitive system.  
Formula has been oriented towards the growth of the 
system: from 1986 until 2006 it was mainly linked to  the 
number of students. In some occasion the universities 
chose opportunistic behaviour in order to manipulate the 
formula. In 2006, besides the number of students, criteria 
for quality and performance have been introduced with a 
focus on efficiency (Amaral et al. 2007). Research 
funding aims at promoting the internationalisation of the 
system by using foreign reviewers, on a more 
competitive basis, to evaluate the quality of research, 
which is organized in “Research Units” (most of them 
placed in the HEIs) and “Associated Laboratories”. This 
has resulted in a system of direct financing of research 
units bypassing national research institutions (Amaral et 
al. 2007). 
 
 
The uncontrolled expansion of the private sector, the public 
polytechnic academic drift and excessive pedagogical 
autonomy of public universities led to great mismatch between 
the outputs of the HE and the needs of the labour market. This 
increased graduate unemployment rates and paved the way for 
professional accreditation. The CRUP (council of Portuguese 
university rectors) decided to lead the implementation of the 
quality assessment system in order to guarantee the quality of 
public universities vis a vis private ones. At present there in no 
national accreditation run or controlled by the state, and the 
public universities have full pedagogical autonomy. In sum, 
there are three main evaluation/approval schemes: 
registration/approval of institutions and study programmes by 
the state, with almost no selection; the national quality 
assessment system (led by CRUP) and various schemes run by 
professional organizations. 
Ex post Research evaluation plays an important role in the 
context of research unit and associated laboratories selection 
and funding.  
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THE NETHER 
-LANDS 
 
Public funding of universities is allocated through 
formula (90%) and project funding (10%). The 
formula has a teaching component linked to the 
number of students and study performance. Re-
search component has a strategic share (55%), that 
was aimed at funding strategic research but it is 
still is still based mainly on historical allocation; 
research formula also considers PhD productivity, 
attraction of research contracts, top research 
schools (Boozeroy and de Weert, 2007; 
Jongbloed, 2007). The direct funding is allocated 
by the Research Council (NWO) in the form of 
competitive grants and by the Royal Netherlands 
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) in the 
form of support for Academy researchers and pro-
fessors. The competition takes place on the basis 
of bottom-up research proposals. A growing share 
of funding is allocated through programs oriented 
to specific issues of societal relevance, where 
goals are set together by government, science and 
industry representatives.  
 
 
After Bologna the need to introduce accreditation increased, and 
in 2003 a new accreditation system was introduced, with the 
major goal to ensure the transparency of the system. The Neth-
erlands Accreditation Organization (NAO) was created. Ac-
creditation is based on the same principles of self evaluation and 
peer review in the pre-existing quality assessment system, in 
which this country was pioneer. External assessment are carried 
out by quality agencies, the accreditation is given by NAO. 
Consequences for non accreditation are loss of study grants, 
funding of the programme, and awarding degree with a legal 
status. HEIs take initiative for accreditation: they invite a quality 
agency to assess the quality of a programme. There have been 
some long-standing themes in the HE decisions about quality: 
the balance between autonomy and accountability, the need to 
introduce instruments that could show the Dutch quality stan-
dards to the outside world. The Bologna process has been a ma-
jor driver for HE system change.  
Research evaluation supports the project selection process; ob-
taining funds signals high academic prestige and coherence with 
government goal.  
Ex post research evaluation is supervised by the QANU and the 
academic bodies. Each unit should self evaluate every three 
years and is evaluated externally every six years. The results of 
the assessment is one element considered within the project 
funding selection. The Standard Evaluation Protocol (SEP) de-
fines the main elements of the evaluation system, which aims at 
assessing scientific as well as managerial quality.  
 
 
ITALY 
 
The reform of the HE system in 1989 introduced 
the university autonomy principle; in 1993 the 
funding model was changed from a line-item to a 
lump sum budget allocation, based on historical 
cost. In 1996 was introduced formula, which re-
distributed a relevant share of funding between 
universities according to simple teaching produc-
tivity criteria. In early 2000 a new formula was 
introduced that allocated a small part of the lump 
sum budget according to more complex and so-
phisticated input in research (project funding) and 
in teaching, that was  inspired by the Bologna 
process (productivity in terms of credits, degrees). 
The new model became increasingly complex and 
detailed, with many bounding quantitative re-
quirements. Similarly to the Portuguese and Nor-
wegian cases, opportunistic behaviours of HEIs 
were favoured. There is no agency for the alloca-
tion of funds; the CNR lost this role in 1999. Pro-
ject funding for academic research have been tra-
ditionally oriented to free research, but it is de-
creasing. Programs oriented to promote specific 
themes and/or industry-university cooperation are 
less important; in some cases they have been even 
suspended and not awarded on a regularly basis 
(Potì and Reale, 2007). Regional government still 
have a very marginal role.  
 
 
Despite the introduction of the autonomy principle in 1989, in 
Italy the structure of degree courses did not change much until 
1999, when the Ministry rapidly transposed the principles and 
criteria of the Bologna declaration. The new degree system de-
leted the established structures and eased an impressive multi-
plication of the courses. The reform had to reconcile two con-
flicting factors: the institutional autonomy in the definition of 
university curricula and the need for legal validity of degrees 
through references to national regulation. The 'classe' was intro-
duced, to group degree programmes with similar qualifying 
educational objectives. Nevertheless, the 'classe' device proved 
to be too weak. The introduction of requirements and standards 
even more stringent was seen as the only way to limit such ex-
plosion and bring order again.  
Evaluation of quality teaching is up to the HEIs.  
The VTR 2001-3 wa the first and the only ex post research eval-
uation process; it aimed at assessing the quality of the scientific 
production of the HEIs (peer review), the capability to invest 
and attract financial and human resources for research. There 
was a cultural impact in disciplines where systematic evaluation 
was a novelty; university leadership was interested in the HEIs 
ranking; results still dtermine the allocation of a share of the 
lump sum allocation.  
Evaluation also serves project selection and in some discipline 
signals academic prestige; evaluation success rate is also. 
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